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NOTES AND, COMMENT
'Domestic Relations: Right of a wife to recover from her husband
for personal injuries.-The recently decided case in Wisconsin of
Wait v. Pierce' has revolutionized the law regarding husband and wife
in this state and has taken from the male of the species the last vestige
of authority which he may have had under the yoke of matrimony.
Mathilda J. Wait brought an action for injuries to her person,
against George P. Pierce and another, doing business as the Menasha
Motor Car Co., wherein defendants impleaded G. E. Wait, husband
of the plaintiff as party defendant and filed a crosscomplaint against
him, claiming that he had caused the-injuries. The husband demurred
on the grounds that as husband he is not liable for injuries to his wife
and cannot be joined as a defendant. Court sustained the demurrer
holding that a wife cannot maintain an action against the husband for
injuries sustained by reason of his negligence. On appeal, the supreme
court overruled this decision. There was however a strong dissenting
opinion filed by justice Eschweiler and two associates.
The basis of the courts' decision rests largely on a statute of Wis-
consin2 providing, "any married woman may bring and maintain an
action in her own name for any injury to her person or character
the same. as if she were sole," from which the court construes that
this also includes a right of action against the husband.
That no common law right of action existed in favor of either
spouse for personal injuries is unquestioned.3 Cooley states "For
a personal tort by the husband to her person or reputation, the wife
can sustain no action but must rely upon the criminal law for her
protection or seek relief in divorce proceedings." In various "juris-
dictions it has been held that statutes enabling the wife to sue and be
sued as a femme sole, do not include the right of either spouse to bring
a tort action against each other. However the wife is not left destitute
of all recourse since both at common law and under the code she may
resort to the criminal law or sue for divorce and alimony.
In Strom v. Strom4 the wife brought action for assault and battery
by the husband upon her person and the court holding against the
wife said: "A husband cannot and never could bring an action against
his wife for a personal tort committed by her against him during
coverture and hence ipso facto she had no right in this respect since
her rights are expressly limited by statute to the same rights which
the law gives him."
The court states in Peters v. Peters,3 that even though the wife was
authorized by statute to prosecute and defend all actions as if un-
' Wait v. Pierce 2o9 N.W. 475. (Wis.)
'Chap. 89 Laws i881 and Stat. 246.oi, 246.o2, 246.o3.
'Cooley on Torts (3rd Ed. p. 474).
6 L.R.A. (N.S.) i91.
156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 699.
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married and a femme sole, this does not include a right of tort action
against her husband and the fact that a provision in the statutes per-
mitted either spouse to maintain an action against each other for
property, impliedly prohibits a right of tort action. Also in Thompson
v. Thompson6 the court states "that even where the wife was ex-
pressly given all the rights of a femme sole, the common law relation
of husband and wife was not so modified as to give her a right of
action against her husband for assault and battery. Analogous decisions
have been handed down in many other cases among which are Hobbs
v. Hobbs,7 Abbott v. Abbott s and the New York case of Schultz v.
Schultz.9
It is clear that under the common law the legal identity of the wife
was merged in the husband and manifestly he could not sue himself.
In most other jurisdictions where a statute similar or identical to the
one in Wisconsin prevails, the courts have held that as against the
husband and wife has no right of tort action.
Apparently the majority opinion in this case reached its decision
by a broad and liberal interpretation of the aforementioned statute
conferring on married women the rights of a femme sole but our
state Constitution '0 provides that "such parts of the common law as
are now in force in the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with
this Constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this state
until altered or suspended by the legislature." Now it is a firmly
rooted doctrine that the common law is not to be done away with,
altered or modified unless the legislature intent so to do is clearly
evidenced and the use of broad and general language is not necessarily
indicative of such intent, as held in Kappers v. Cast Stone Constr. Co.:"
In further substantiation of this point there is the Wisconsin case of
Lontsdorf v. Lontsdorf12 where the wife brought action for the alie-
nation of her husband's affections and the court held that "although
the statutes enabled a married woman to bring an action in her own
name for injury to her person or character, such statute cannot be con-
strued either to confer a new right for injuries resulting from enticing
away the husband or to confer a right to sue for any such injuries"
thus intimating that the statute was not sufficiently clear and unmis-
takable and consequently the common law doctrine shall take pre-
cedence.
In the majority opinion it is now contended that there is express
language abolishing the common law and quite obviously the statute
is ambiguous. If by a decision of this very court' 3 it has been settled
that the wife has no right of action against another for alienation of
his affections, then a fortiore how can the same statute confer upon
£218 U.S. 611, 615, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1153, 31 S. Ct. ii.
'7o Me. 381.
867 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27.
189 N.Y. 644.
,0Sec. 13 Art. 14.
184 Wis. 627, 633, 2oo N.W. 376.
"118 Wis. 159.
"Lontsdorf v. Lontsdorf (supra).
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the wife the right to bring a tort action against the husband himself ?
Palpably the intent of the legislature is not clear and therefore the
common law should prevail.
It is an accepted tenet, that under the common law the husband
had no right of action against his spouse for being one with her, he
could not sue himself. The construction of the statute by the majority
in this case creates new rights for the wife and hence necessarily
creates new rights for the husband since the constitution guarantees
equal rights for all. Now if such radical change in the law had been
the intent of the legislature, it must surely have expressed itself with
indisputable dearness and definiteness. This it did not do.
Undoubtedly the legislature intended to remove discriminations
against married women and give them equal rights with their husbands
before the law and consequently the statute should not be construed as
creating new rights, which it does under the interpretation of the ma-
jority opinion since at common law neither spouse had the right to
sue the other. Neither was it the intent of the legislature to open the
door to increased litigation which might presumably follow for as
Justice Eschweiler states: "The uninvited kiss no matter how cold
and chaste, upon the non-consenting alabaster feme sole brow, is an
assault and battery and substantial damages may be awarded for
such."1 4
Regarding the public policy affected by this decision, it has always
been recognized that while marriage is a civil contract, so far as its
validity in law is concerned, yet the moment such contract is entered
into, a status of an exclusive nature arises between the parties, and
many of the rules applicable to contrasts are necessarily excluded from
application to the marriage contract. The peace and tranquility of
the conjugal relation demand that each party to a marriage forswear,
certain rights which each enjoys as a sole and hence the common law
has always refused to recognize tort liabilities between the members
of a family.
URBAN R. WITTIG
Automobiles: Guest and invitee; negligence, degree of care.-
With the great volume of automobile cases which has of recent years
kept our courts busy to capacity one might think that the law as it ap-
plies to owners and operators of motor vehicles should be quite definitely
settled. To a considerable extent this is true and because of this fact
comparatively few such cases are being appealed. Occasionally, how-
ever, a decision is rendered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court which
materially changes the practising attorney's preconceived notions as to
this branch of the law.
The liability of the owner or operator of an automobile to an invited
guest in the various situations that may arise has been, and still is, some-
what in doubt. A decision of considerable importance on this phase of
the law was decided by the Supreme Court on October 12, 1926.1
"36 Wis. 657, i7 Am. Rep. 504.
Cleary v. Eckart, 211 N.W. (Wis.).
